A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player's information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain conditions on the evolution of the common and private information, a dynamic programming characterization of the value of the game (if it exists) is presented. If the value of the zero-sum game does not exist, then the dynamic program provides bounds on the upper and lower values of the game. This dynamic program is then used for a class of zero-sum stochastic games with complete information on one side and partial information on the other, that is, games where one player has complete information about state, actions and observation history while the other player may only have partial information about the state and action history. For such games, it is shown that the value exists and can be characterized using the dynamic program. It is further shown that for this class of games, the dynamic program can be used to compute an equilibrium strategy for the more informed player in which the player selects its action using its private information and the common information belief.
Introduction
Zero-sum games have been widely used as a model of strategic decision-making in the presence of adversaries. Such decision-making scenarios arise in a range of domains including (i) security of cyber-physical and infrastructure systems such as the power grid and water networks in the presence of cyber or physical attacks [40, 3, 2, 41, 43, 37] , (ii) cyber-security of networked computing and communication systems [40, 1] , (iii) designing anti-poaching measures [12, 11, 9] , (iv) military operations in the presence of hostile agents [16] and, (v) competitive markets and geopolitical interactions [24, 4] . In many cases, the adversarial interactions occur over time in a dynamic and uncertain environment. Zero-sum stochastic games provide a useful model for these situations. In these games, two players may jointly control the evolution of the state of a stochastic dynamic system with one player trying to minimize the total cost while the other trying to maximize it. In stochastic games with symmetric information, all players have the same information about the state and action histories. Such games have been extensively studied in the literature in both zero-sum and nonzero-sum settings [14, 13, 6] . In many situations of interest, however, the players may have different information about the state and action histories. A potential attacker of a cyber-physical system for example, may not have the same information as the defender; adversaries in a battlefield may have different information about the surroundings and about each other. The focus of this paper is on such asymmetric information settings.
We adopt a model of asymmetric information that was originally developed for decentralized stochastic control [29] . This model partitions each player's information at each time into a common information part and a private information part. The common information at time t is known to all players at that time and at all times in the future. In addition to the common information, each player may have some private information. It has been noted in the existing literature that this model subsumes a wide range of information structures [29, 27] .
In our model, it may be the case that no player knows the current state of the underlying stochastic system perfectly. Further, since each player may have some private information, one player's information is not necessarily included in the other player's information. The partial observability of the state, the asymmetry of information and the fact that each player may have some private information complicates the characterization and computation of the equilibrium cost (value) and equilibrium strategies. We provide two results for this general model of zero-sum stochastic game with asymmetric information: (i) If the game has a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies, then our result provides dynamic programming based characterizations of the value of the game. Each step of these programs involves a min-max (or a max-min) problem over the space of prescriptions which are functions from players' private information to actions. (ii) If the game does not have a Nash equilibrium, then our dynamic programs provide a lower bound on the upper value of the game and an upper bound on the lower value of the game.
We then specialize our model to the case where (i) one player (say, the attacker) has partial information on the system state and the other player's (say, the defender's) actions; (ii) the other player (i.e. the defender) has complete information, that is, it knows the system state as well as the attacker's information. We allow both players to control the system state. Our model can be viewed as a generalization of the models in [33, 34, 20, 42] . We first show that a Nash equilibrium exists in our model and thus the upper and lower values are equal. This allows us to characterize the value of the game using our dynamic programming approach. We also describe some structural properties of the value functions in the dynamic program that could be leveraged for computational efficiency. Further, we find a sufficient statistic for the more informed player, i.e, we show that there exists a Nash equilibrium where the more informed player plays a common information belief based strategy [27] , [31] and that our dynamic programming approach can be used to compute this strategy.
Related Work

Stochastic games of symmetric information:
In this stochastic game model, the players have access to the same information. Thus, at any time t, each player has no uncertainty regarding other players' information and makes a decision anticipating the other players' strategies. Such games of symmetric information have been extensively studied in the literature [14, 13, 6] . Because of this symmetry, players' shared information (or a function of it) can be treated as a state and utilized to decompose a dynamic game into simpler single-stage Bayesian games. These single-stage games can then be solved in a backward inductive manner to obtain the value and Nash equilibria (if any exist). In this paper, we focus on models in which players have different information and thus the methodology described above for symmetric information games is not directly applicable to our model. 2. Zero-sum games with limited information on one side: Stochastic zero-sum games with complete information on one side and limited information on the other have been investigated before with varying degrees of generality. In [23, 33] , the state evolution was uncontrolled, in [34, 20] , the state could only be controlled by the more-informed player, and in [42] , the state could be controlled by both players. In all these works (except [34] ), both players' actions are commonly observed and, the less-informed player has no state information. A related model in which the system is uncontrolled and players' actions are commonly observed but both players may have asymmetric state information has been investigated in [15] . In our general model in Section 2, both players may have imperfect information about the system and the other player's actions, and both players may control the system state. We also consider a specialized model in Section 5 where (i) the defender has complete information while the attacker has partial information on the state history and the defender's action history; (ii) both players may influence the state evolution. These two features differentiate our work from prior work mentioned above.
Stochastic games of asymmetric information with strategy-independent common information beliefs:
In [27] , a common information based dynamic program was developed for finding Nash equilibria in general (i.e. not necessarily zero-sum) stochastic games of asymmetric information. The key idea in this approach is to first convert the game of asymmetric information into a virtual game of symmetric information. This virtual game of symmetric information is then solved using a common information based dynamic program. However, this approach relies on an assumption on the players' information (see Assumption 2 in [27] ). This assumption holds only for certain classes of information structures and may not necessarily be true for the asymmetric information games described in Sections 2 and 5. 4. Common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria in stochastic games of asymmetric information: Authors in [31] consider a stochastic game model in which the system state can be decomposed into a public state that is commonly observed by all players and a private state that is privately observed by each player. In this model, all the players' past actions are commonly observed and, additionally, an imperfect version of players' private state may be disclosed to all the players at each time. A special case of this model has been considered in [39] . For the models in [31] and [39] , the authors provide characterizations of perfect Bayesian equilibria under some assumptions on the evolution of players' private state. In this paper, we focus only on two-player zero-sum games. However, the system dynamics and the information structure in our model are more general than those in the model of [31, 39] . For instance, unlike in [31, 39] , players' actions may not be fully observed in our model. Further, the solutions in [31, 39] rely on strong existence assumptions that may not be true in general.
Our work is most closely related to [26] and [27] . We follow the approach in [26] and build on its results. The system model in [26] conformed to a specific structure, that is, the system state could be decomposed into three components: a public state that is commonly observed (perhaps partially) and a privately observed component for each player. The model in our paper is substantially more general than in [26] . Another major restriction in [26] was that the players were allowed to play only pure strategies. In this paper, we allow the players to play behavioral strategies. Our model is similar to [27] but we do not make the critical assumption made in [27] that the common information based beliefs be strategy-independent (see Assumption 2 of [27] ). Removing this assumption makes our model much more widely applicable than the model in [27] .
Contributions
The main contributions of our paper are:
1. We consider a general stochastic zero-sum game model in which the players select their actions using different information. For this general model, we provide a dynamic programming characterization of the value of the zerosum game, if it exists. If the value does not exist, then our characterization provides bounds on the upper and lower values of the zero-sum game. 2. We then specialize our model to the case in which the defender has complete information and the attacker may have partial information. For this model, we show that the value of the zero-sum game exists and that our dynamic program characterizes the value of this game. 3. For the game in Section 5, we show that our dynamic program can be used to find an equilibrium strategy for the more-informed player such that its behavioral action is a function of its private information and the common information based belief. 4. For the specialized model in Section 5, we prove that the value functions in our dynamic program satisfy some structural properties that can be leveraged to make the dynamic program computationally more tractable.
One such property is that the value functions are piecewise linear and convex in the common information belief.
Notation
Random variables/vectors are denoted by upper case letters, their realizations by the corresponding lower case letters. In general, subscripts are used as time index while superscripts are used to index decision-making agents. For time indices t 1 ≤ t 2 , X t1:t2 (resp. g t1:t2 ) is the short hand notation for the variables (X t1 , X t1+1 , ..., X t2 ) (resp. functions (g t1 , . . . , g t2 )). Similarly, X 1:2 is the short hand notation for the collection of variables (X 1 , X 2 ). Operators P(·) and E[·] denote the probability of an event, and the expectation of a random variable respectively. For random variables/vectors X and Y , P(·|Y = y), E[X|Y = y] and P(X = x | Y = y) are denoted by P(·|y), E[X|y] and P(x | y), respectively. For a strategy g, we use P g (·) (resp. E g [·]) to indicate that the probability (resp. expectation) depends on the choice of g. For any finite set A, ∆A denotes the probability simplex over the set A.
Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We formulate the game in Section 2 and construct a virtual game with symmetric information in Section 3. In Section 4, we construct an expanded virtual game and use it provide a dynamic programming characterization of the value. In Section 5, we analyze the model with complete information on one side and partial information on the other. We conclude the paper in Section 6. Proofs of key results are provided in the appendices.
Problem Formulation
Consider a dynamic system with two players. The system operates in discrete time over a horizon T . Let X t ∈ X t be the state of the system at time t, and let U i t ∈ U i t be the action of player i at time t, where i = 1, 2. The state of the system evolves in a controlled Markovian manner as
where W s t is the system noise. There are two observation processes
where W 1 t and W 2 t are observation noises. We assume that the sets X t , U i t and Y i t are finite for all i and t. Further, the random variables X 1 , W s t , W i t (referred to as the primitive random variables) can take finitely many values and are mutually independent.
Information Structure
The collection of variables (i.e. observations, actions) available to player i at time t is denoted by I i t . I i t is a subset of all observations until time t and actions until t − 1, i.e, I i t ⊆ {Y 1:2 1:t , U 1:2 1:t−1 }. The set of all possible realizations of I i t is denoted by I i t . Information I i t can be decomposed into private and common information, i.e. I i t = C t ∪ P i t . Common information C t is the set of variables known to both players at time t while variables in the private information P i t are known only to player i. Let C t be the set of all realizations of common information at time t and let P i t be the set of all realizations of private information for player i at time t. We make the following assumption on the evolution of common and private information. This is similar to Assumption 1 of [27] 1 .
Assumption 1 The evolution of common and private information available
to the players is as follows:
where ζ t+1 is a fixed transformation.
The private information evolves as
where ξ i t+1 is a fixed transformation.
As noted in [29] and [27] , a number of information structures satisfy the above assumption. We briefly mention a few below:
No common information:
Consider the case where each player only has access to its own observations and actions, i.e., I i t = {Y i 1:t , U i 1:t−1 }, i = 1, 2. In this case, there is no common information, i.e., C t = ∅. It is easy to verify that Assumption 1 is valid in this case.
No private information:
Consider the case where all observations and actions are public, i.e., I i t = {Y 1:2 1:t , U 1:2 1:t−1 }. In this case, players do not have any private information, i.e., P i t = ∅. Once again, Assumption 1 is true. 3. Information structure in [39] : In this model, player i has a private state X i t , i = 1, 2. Player i knows its private state and both players' actions are commonly observed. This information structure can be seen as a special case of our model in the following manner: let the state X t := (X 1 t , X 2 t ) and the observation processes Y i t = X i t for i = 1, 2. Define the information sets at time t as
Clearly, this information structure satisfies Assumption 1. Similarly, information structures in [31] and [26] can also be seen as special cases of our model.
Full state information on one side and quantized state information on the
other: Consider the model in which player 1 knows the state X t and player 2 sees a quantized version of X t . That is,
where q is an arbitrary function. Both players' actions are commonly observed. Since player 1 knows the state X t and Y 2 t is a deterministic function of the state, player 1 also knows player 2's observation Y 2 t . Thus, in this case,
Clearly, this model satisfies Assumption 1.
Strategies and Values
Players can use any information available to them to select their actions and we allow behavioral strategies for both players. Thus, player i chooses a distribution δU i t over its action space using a control law g i t :
Player i's action at time t is randomly chosen from U i t according to the distribution δU i t . We will at times refer to δU i t as player i's behavioral action at time t. It will be helpful for our analysis to explicitly describe the randomization procedure used by the players. To do so, we assume that player i has access to i.i.d. random variables K i 1:T that are uniformly distributed over the interval (0, 1]. The variables K 1 1:T , K 2 1:T are independent of each other and of the primitive random variables. Further, player i has access to a mechanism κ that takes as input K i t and a distribution over U i t and generates a random action with the input distribution. Thus, player i's action at time t can be written as
Remark 1 One choice of the mechanism κ can be described as follows: Suppose U i t = {1, 2, ..n} and the input distribution is (p 1 , ...p n ). We can partition the interval (0, 1] into n intervals (a
. . , n. The collection of control laws g i = (g i 1 , . . . , g i T ) is referred to as the control strategy of player i, and the pair of control strategies (g 1 , g 2 ) is referred to as a strategy profile. Let the set of all possible control strategies for player i be G i .
The total expected cost associated with a strategy profile (g 1 , g 2 ) is
where c t : X t × U 1 t × U 2 t → R is the cost function at time t. Player 1 wants to minimize the total expected cost, while Player 2 wants to maximize it. We refer to this zero-sum game as Game G .
Definition 1 The upper value of the game G is defined as
The lower value of the game G is defined as
If the upper and lower values are the same, they are referred to as the value of the game and denoted by S(G ).
A Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game G is a strategy profile (g 1 * , g 2 * ) such that for every g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 ∈ G 2 , we have J(g 1 * , g 2 ) ≤ J(g 1 * , g 2 * ) ≤ J(g 1 , g 2 * ).
Nash equilibria in zero-sum games satisfy the following property [30] .
Proposition 1 If a Nash equilibrium in Game G exists, then for every Nash equilibrium (g 1 * , g 2 * ) in Game G , we have
Remark 2 Note that the existence of a Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed in general. However, if players have perfect recall, i.e.
for every i and t, then the existence of a behavioral strategy equilibrium is guaranteed by Kuhn's theorem [22] .
The objective of this work is to characterize the upper and lower values S u (G ) and S l (G ) of Game G . To this end, we will define a virtual game G v and an "expanded" virtual game G e . These virtual games will be used to obtain bounds on the upper and lower values of the original game G .
Virtual Game G v
The virtual game G v is constructed using the methodology in [27] . This game involves the same set of primitive random variables as in Game G . The two players of game G are replaced by two virtual players in G v . The virtual players operate as follows. At each time t, virtual player i selects a function Γ i t that maps private information P i t to a distribution δU i t over the space U i t . We refer to these functions as prescriptions. Let B i t be the set of all possible prescriptions for virtual player i at time t (i.e. B i t is the set of all mappings from P i t to ∆U i t ). Once the virtual players select their prescriptions, the action U i t is randomly generated according to distribution Γ i t (P i t ). More precisely, the system dynamics for this game are given by:
where the functions f t , h i t , ξ i t , κ and ζ t are the same as in G . In the virtual game, virtual players use the common information C t to select their prescriptions at time t. The ith virtual player selects its prescription according to a control law
For virtual player i, the collection of control laws over the entire time horizon χ i = (χ i 1 , . . . , χ i T ) is referred to as its control strategy. Let H i t be the set of all possible control laws for virtual player i at time t and let H i be the set of all possible control strategies for virtual player i, i.e.
The total cost associated with the game for a strategy profile (χ 1 , χ 2 ) is
where the function c t is the same as in Game G .
The following lemma establishes a connection between the original game G and the virtual game G v constructed above.
respectively, the upper and lower values of the virtual game
G v . Then, S l (G ) = S l (G v ) and S u (G ) = S u (G v ).
Consequently, if a Nash equilibrium exists in the original game
The authors in [27] use the virtual game to find equilibrium costs and strategies for a stochastic dynamic game of asymmetric information. However, the methodology in [27] is applicable only under the assumption that the posterior beliefs on state X t and private information P 1,2 t given the common information C t do not depend on the strategy profile being used (see Assumption 2 in [27] ). We will refer to this assumption as the strategy-independent beliefs (SIB) assumption. As pointed out in [27] , the SIB assumption is satisfied by some special system models and information structures but is not true for general stochastic dynamic games. A simple example which does not satisfy the SIB assumption is the following delayed sharing information structure [28] :
Another example of a game where the SIB assumption fails is presented in Section 5.
Thus, we are faced with the following situation: if our zero-sum game satisfies the SIB assumption, we can adopt the results in [27] to find equilibrium costs (i.e. the value) of our game. However, if the zero-sum game does not satisfy the SIB assumption, then the methodology of [27] is inapplicable. In the next section, we will develop a methodology to bound the upper and lower values of the zero-sum game G even when the game does not satisfy the SIB assumption.
Expanded Virtual Game G e with Prescription History
In order to circumvent the SIB assumption, we now construct an expanded virtual game G e by increasing the amount of information available to virtual players in game G v . In this new game G e , the state dynamics, observation processes, primitive random variables and cost function are all the same as in the game G v . The only difference is in the information used by the virtual players to select their prescriptions. The virtual players now have access to the common information C t as well as all the past prescriptions of both players, i.e., Γ 1:2 1:t−1 . Virtual player i selects its prescription at time t using a control law
. LetH i t be the set of all such control laws at time t for virtual player i.H i :=H i 1 × · · · ×H i T is the set of all control strategies for player i. The total cost associated with the game for a strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) is
Remark 3 Note that any strategy χ i ∈ H i is equivalent to the strategyχ i ∈H i that satisfies the following condition: for each time t and for each realization of common information c t ∈ C t ,
Hence, with slight abuse of notation, we can say that the strategy space H i in the virtual game G v is a subset of the strategy spaceH i in the expanded game G e . For this reason, the function J in (18) can be thought of as an extension of the function J in (17) .
Remark 4 Expansion of information structures has been used in prior work to find equilibrium costs/strategies. See, for example, [5] which studies a linear stochastic differential game where both players have a common noisy observation of the state.
Upper and Lower Values of Games G v and G e
We will now establish the relationship between the upper and lower values of the expanded game G e and the virtual game G v . To do so, we define the following mappings between the strategies in games G v and G e .
Definition 2 Let ̺ i :H 1 ×H 2 → H i be an operator that maps a strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) in virtual game G e to a strategy χ i for virtual player i in game G v as follows: For t = 1, 2, . . . , T,
whereγ j s =χ j s (c s ,γ 1:2 1:s−1 ) for every 1 ≤ s ≤ t − 1 and j = 1, 2. We denote the ordered pair (̺ 1 , ̺ 2 ) by ̺.
The mapping ̺ is defined in such a way that the strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) and the strategy profile ̺(χ 1 ,χ 2 ) induce identical dynamics in the respective games G e and G v .
Lemma 2 Let (χ 1 , χ 2 ) and (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) be strategy profiles for games G v and G e , such that χ i = ̺ i (χ 1 ,χ 2 ), i = 1, 2. Then,
Proof See Appendix B.
⊓ ⊔
The following theorem connects the upper and lower values of the two virtual games and the original game.
Theorem 1 The lower and upper values of the three games defined above satisfy the following:
Consequently, if a Nash equilibrium exists in the original game G , then S(G ) = S l (G e ) = S u (G e ).
Proof See Appendix C.
⊓ ⊔
Using Theorem 1, we can obtain bounds on the upper and lower values of the original game by computing the upper and lower values of the expanded game G e .
The Dynamic Programming Characterization
We now describe a methodology for finding the upper and lower values of the expanded game G e . Suppose the virtual players are using the strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) in the expanded game G e . Let Π t be the virtual players' belief on the state and private information based on their information in game G e . Thus, Π t is defined as
wherec t is as defined in equation (22) .
Proof See Appendix D. ⊓ ⊔ Remark 5 Because (23) is an almost sure equality, the transformation F t in Lemma 3 is not necessarily unique. In Appendix D, we identify a class of transformations such that for any transformation F t in this class, Lemma 3 holds. We denote this class by B.
We now describe two dynamic programs, one for each virtual player in G e .
The min-max dynamic program
The minimizing virtual player (virtual player 1) in game G e solves the following dynamic program. Define V u T +1 (π T +1 ) = 0 for every π T +1 . In a backward inductive manner, at each time t ≤ T and for each possible common information belief π t and prescriptions γ 1
Note that F τ is the common information belief update function defined in Lemma 3.
The following theorem establishes that the two dynamic programs described above characterize the upper and lower values of game G e .
Theorem 2
The upper and lower values of the expanded virtual game G e are given by
Further, the strategiesχ 1 * andχ 2 * as defined in Definition 4 are, respectively, min-max and max-min strategies in the expanded virtual game G e .
Proof See Appendix G. ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 2 gives us a dynamic programming characterization of the upper and lower values of the expanded game. As mentioned in Theorem 1, the upper and lower values of the expanded game provide bounds on the corresponding values of the original game. Further, if the original game has a Nash equilibrium, the dynamic programs of Theorem 2 characterize the value of the game. Note that this applies to any dynamic game of the form in Section 2 where the common information is non-decreasing in time and the private information has a "state-like" update equation (see Assumption 1). As noted before, a variety of information structures satisfy this assumption [29] , [27] .
The computational burden of solving the dynamic programs of Theorem 2 would depend on the specific information structure being considered, i.e., on the exact nature of common and private information. At one extreme, we can consider the following instance of the original game G : C t = (X 1:t ), P 1 t = P 2 t = ∅. It is easy to see that in this case, the common information belief can be replaced by the current state in the dynamic programs and the prescriptions are simply distributions on the players' finite action sets. Also, in this case, w u t and w l t are bilinear functions of the prescriptions and the min-max/max-min problems at each stage of the dynamic program can be solved by a linear program [32] . On the other extreme, we can consider an instance of game G with C t = ∅, P i t = Y i 1:t , i = 1, 2. In this case, the common information belief will be on the current state and observation histories of the two players and the prescriptions will take values in a large-dimensional space. Also, the functions w u t and w l t (for t < T ) in this case do no have any apparent structure that can be exploited for efficient computation of the min-max and max-min values in the dynamic program. One general approach that can be used for any instance of game G is to discretize the CIB belief space and compute approximate value functions V u t and V l t in a backward inductive manner. However, we believe that significant structural and computational insights can be obtained by specializing the dynamic programs of Theorem 2 to the specific instance of the game being considered. We demonstrate this in the next section where we discuss an information structure where one player has complete information while the other player has only partial information. We will show that in this case, the functions w u t and w l t turn out to be identical at all times t and they satisfy some structural properties that can be leveraged for computation. Further, we will show that for this information structure, the dynamic programming characterization in Theorem 2 allows us to find an equilibrium strategy for player 1 in the original game G .
Comparison with [31] and [39] : In [31] , the authors considered an n-player stochastic game model which can potentially be non-zero sum. In this model, each player has a private state that is privately observed by the corresponding player and a public state that is commonly observed by all the players. The model in [31] additionally allows players' private information to be partially revealed in the form of common observations. The actions of all the players in this model are commonly observed. The authors also make the assumption that the evolution of the private states of the players is conditionally independent. The model in [39] can be viewed as a special case of the model in [31] . For these models, backward inductive algorithms were presented to compute perfect Bayesian equilibria. Consider the case when the number of players in the games of [31] and [39] is two and the games are zero-sum. Then:
1. The models in [31] and [39] can be viewed as special cases of our model in Section 2. 2. The players in these games have perfect recall. Hence, we can use Kuhn's theorem to conclude that a Nash equilibrium and, thus, the value exists for these zero-sum games. Therefore, we can use the dynamic programs in Section 4.2 to the characterize the value of these zero-sum games. This characterization does not make any additional assumptions. The backward inductive algorithms in [31] and [39] , however, require the existence of a particular kind of fixed point solution at each stage. This fixed point solution is not guaranteed to exist in general. Thus, there may be instances where the approaches in [31] and [39] fail to characterize the value of the game while our dynamic program in Section 4.2 can always characterize it.
Games with Complete Information on One Side and Partial Information on the Other
In this section, we consider a special case of the original game G (described in Section 2) where player 1 has complete information, that is, it knows the entire state history as well as the observation and action histories of both players. On the other hand, player 2 has only partial information on the state and player 1's action history. For games with this information structure, we show that (i) a Nash equilibrium, and hence the value of the game, exist; (ii) the value can be computed using the methodology proposed in Section 4; (iii) the dynamic program in Section 4 also characterizes an equilibrium strategy for player 1;
(iv) the value functions of the dynamic program satisfy some key structural properties that may be useful for computational purposes.
System Model
Consider a system with state evolution as in equation (1). At each time t, player 1 observes the state perfectly but player 2 gets an imperfect observation Y 2 t defined as follows:
Player 1 has complete information: at each time t, it knows the entire state, observation and action histories. Player 2 has partial information: at each time t, it knows only the observation history Y 2 1:t and its own action history U 2 1:t−1 . Thus, the total information available to each player at t is as follows:
Clearly, I 2 t ⊆ I 1 t , that is, player 1 is more informed than player 2. The common and private information for this game can be written as follows: C t = I 2 t ,
The total expected cost is as defined in (6) . As before, Player 1 wants to minimize the total expected cost, while Player 2 wants to maximize it. Players' strategies are as described in (5) . We refer to this game as Game G special .
Remark 6 Consider a scenario in which player 1's information at time t is
. That is, player 2 observes a quantized version of the current system state and player 1's previous action. At first glance, it might appear that the second player's private information for this scenario is P 2 t = Y 2 1:t and, thus, it does not fit the model in Game G special . However, player 1 knows the function h 2 t and the variables X t , U 1 t−1 , U 2 t−1 . Thus, it can simply compute Y 2 1:t and select its behavior action using {X 1:t , Y 2 1:t , U 1 1:t−1 , U 2 1:t−1 }. In that case, P 2 t = ∅ and, therefore, this scenario fits the model in Game G special . Remark 7 The model described above subsumes the system dynamics and information structures in [33, 20, 42] and [34] . In all these works (except [34] ), the less-informed player does not have any state information and can only observe the more-informed player's action. That is, in these works, Y 2 t = U 1 t−1 (which is a special case of (37) above) and thus, I 2 t = {U 1 1:t−1 , U 2 1:t−1 }. Further, the system dynamics in some of these models are more specialized. In particular, in [33] , the system is uncontrolled and in [20] and [34] , the less-informed player cannot control the state. Note that our model allows for both players to influence the system dynamics (see (1) ).
The following lemmas establish the existence and a structural property of Nash equilibrium strategies in game G special .
Lemma 5 A Nash equilibrium exists in game G special .
Proof Notice that the players have perfect recall. Therefore, as discussed in Remark 2, the existence of a behavioral strategy Nash equilibrium is guaranteed.
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 6 There exists a Nash equilibrium (g 1 * , g 2 * ) such that the control law g 1 * t selects player 1's behavioral action using only X t and I 2 t , i.e,
Proof See Appendix H. ⊓ ⊔
The lemma above implies that, for the purpose of characterizing the value of the game and a min-max strategy for player 1, we can restrict player 1's information structure to be I 1 t = {X t , I 2 t }. Thus, the common and private information become: C t = I 2 t , P 1 t = {X t } and P 2 t = ∅. We refer to this game with reduced private information as Game H . The corresponding virtual game and expanded virtual game are denoted by H v and H e respectively.
Expanded Game and the Dynamic Program
We can now proceed with the construction of the expanded virtual game H e as outlined in Section 4. Recall that in the expanded virtual game, virtual players select prescriptions based on common information and the prescription history.
Belief update
In Game H , player 2 has no private information and player 1's private information P 1 t at time t is just the state X t . Therefore, in the expanded virtual game H e , the common information belief on (X t , P 1 t , P 2 t ) is equivalent to the common information belief on X t alone. Thus, in game H e , the common information belief Π t is a vector of size |X t |. As noted in Remark 5, the common information belief update rule F t is not unique and there is an entire class B of update rules for which Lemma 3 holds. When this class B is specialized to the Game H e , there exists an update rule F t in this class that does not use virtual player 2's prescription γ 2 t . The following lemma makes this precise. Lemma 7 For any strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ), the common information belief Π t evolves almost surely as
where F t is a fixed transformation that does not depend on the virtual players' strategies.
Proof See Appendix I. ⊓ ⊔
Remark 8
In [33] , [34] and [20] , it was assumed that the less informed player cannot control the state evolution. In that case, Lemma 7 is easy to establish. We would like to emphasize that Lemma 7 is true for our more general model where both players control the state evolution.
Dynamic program
Since a Nash equilibrium exists in game H , the upper and lower values of the corresponding expanded virtual game H e are both equal to the value of game H (see Theorem 1) . According to Theorem 2, this value can be obtained by solving either the min-max dynamic program or the max-min dynamic program as discussed in Section 4.2. The dynamic programs in Section 4.2, when specialized to the game H e , are as follows.
The min-max dynamic program: The minimizing virtual player (virtual player 1) in game H e solves the following dynamic program. Define V u T +1 (π T +1 ) = 0 for every π T +1 . In a backward inductive manner, at each time t ≤ T and for each possible common information belief π t and prescriptions γ 1 t , γ 2 t , define w u
where Ξ 1 t and Ξ 2 t are respectively the mappings obtained from the min-max and the max-min dynamic programs stated above and, π t (which is a function of c t , γ 1 1:t−1 ) is obtained in a forward inductive manner using the relation
Note that F τ is the common information belief update function defined in Lemma 7.
Lemma 8
The value of the game H is given by
where V u 1 and V l 1 are respectively the value functions at time t = 1 in the minmax and the max-min dynamic program described above. Further, the strategies χ 1 * andχ 2 * as defined in Definition 5 are, respectively, min-max and max-min strategies in the expanded virtual game H e . Proof This is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.
⊓ ⊔ Thus, the dynamic program for Game H can be obtained by simply specializing the approach used for the more general Game G . In the subsequent sections, we will derive some additional properties of the dynamic program in Section 5.2.2 that are specific to the model of Game H .
An Equilibrium Strategy for the More-informed Player
The following result shows that the mapping Ξ 1 t obtained by solving the minmax dynamic program in Section 5.2.2 can be used to construct an equilibrium strategy for Player 1 in the original game H .
Theorem 3 Define g 1 * for player 1 in game H such that for every t ≤ T and p 1 t , c t ,
where Ξ 1 t is as defined in the min-max dynamic program in Section 5.2.2 and, π t is computed in a forward inductive manner using the following relation
Then g 1 * is an equilibrium (minimax) strategy for player 1 in the original game H .
Proof See Appendix K. ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 3 proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium (g 1 * , g 2 * ) in the game H , where player 1's behavioral action at time t is a function of its private information P 1 t = X t and the common information belief Π t .
Computational Aspects
The value functions in the dynamic programs in Section 5.2.2 admit the following structural property.
Lemma 9 (Piecewise linearity and convexity) At each time t,
1. The min-max value function V u t and the max-min value function V l t are identical. Consequently, the functions w u t and w l t are also identical. Let V t := V l t = V u t and w t := w u t = w l t for each t. 2. There exists a finite collection A t of vectors of size |X t | such that
Consequently, the value functions are piecewise linear and convex functions of the belief π t . 3. The function w t (π t , γ 1 t , γ 2 t ) is linear in γ 2 t for any given π t , γ 1 t ; and it is convex in γ 1 t for any given π t , γ 2 t .
Proof See Appendix J.
⊓ ⊔
The above structural property of value functions allows us to approximately solve the min-max or the max-min dynamic program using a method described below. This method is inspired by the function approximation based methods for dynamic programming in [8] . At each time t, letV t (π t , θ t ) be a representation of the value function V t (π t ) in parametric form, where θ t is a vector representing the parameters. Note that this representation is only an approximation of the true value function V t (π t ) and may not be exactly equal to it. Since we know that the value function V t is piecewise linear and convex, we can enforce the parametric representation V t to be piecewise linear and convex in π t for any θ t . One such representation is as follows:V t (π t , θ t ) = max ℓt∈Ât ℓ t , π t (54) whereÂ t is a finite collection of vectors of size |X t |. Here, θ t is the column vector obtained by stacking all the vectors ℓ ∈Â t . The parameters θ t are chosen in a backward inductive manner such that the functionV l SinceV t+1 is piecewise linear and convex in π t+1 by construction, we can use the same arguments as in the proof (see Appendix J.2) of Lemma 9 to conclude thatŵ t (π t , γ 1 t , γ 2 t ) is linear in γ 2 t and convex in γ 1 t . Exploiting these properties, the min-max problem in (56) can be formulated as min
where ½(u 2 t ) denotes the prescription with γ 2 t (u 2 t ) = 1. The optimization problem stated above is a convex program and, since we have a closed-form representation of the functionsŵ t , this convex program can be solved using standard convex optimization algorithms [7, 10] .
We can then solve the following regression (least-squares) problem to obtain a piecewise linear and convex representation ofV t min θt πt∈St
Thus, at each time t, we have an approximate representation of the value function V t .
Remark 9
Our methodology for solving the dynamic program is similar to the neural network based approximate dynamic programming methods in [8] .
In this neural network based approach, an approximate version of the value function is represented as a neural network. A finite collection of samples of the true value function is obtained and the neural network is then trained on these samples, that is, the weights of the neural network are adjusted such that the parametric representation is close to the true value function. This training is achieved via the regression problem described in (57). Note that by designing the architecture appropriately, it is possible to ensure that the output of the neural network is a piecewise linear and convex function of the input. In fact, our representation in (54) can be viewed as a single layer of neurons with linear activation followed by a max-pooling layer [36] .
In general, there may be a trade-off between the computational burden and approximation error associated with this method. That is, to achieve lower approximation error, we may have to sample a very large number of beliefs. This in turn increases the computational complexity of performing the regression in the approach described above. Understanding the precise relationship between approximation error and computational complexity is a problem for future work and beyond the scope of this paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a general model of zero-sum stochastic games with asymetric information. For this general model, we provided a dynamic programming approach for characterizing the value (if it exists). This dynamic programming characterization of value relies on our construction of two virtual games that have the same value as our original game. If the value does not exist in the original game, then our dynamic program provides bounds on the upper and lower values of the original game. We then focused on game models in which one player has complete game information and the other has partial information. For such games, we showed that the value exists and used our dynamic programming approach to characterize the value. Further, we proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium in such games where the more-informed player plays a common information belief based strategy. We discussed a dynamic programming approach for computing a common information belief based equilibrium strategy for the more-informed player.
A Proof of Lemma 1
It was shown in [27] that there exist bijective mappings M i : G i → H i , i = 1, 2, such that for every g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 ∈ G 2 , we have
Therefore, for any strategy g 1 ∈ G 1 , we have sup
= sup
Consequently,
= inf
This implies that S u (G ) = S u (Gv ). We can similarly prove that S l (G ) = S l (Gv ).
Remark 10
We can also show that a strategy profile (g 1 , g 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium in game G if and only if (M 1 (g 1 ), M 2 (g 2 )) is a Nash equilibrium in game Gv .
B Proof of Lemma 2
Let us consider the evolution of the virtual game Gv under the strategy profile (χ 1 , χ 2 ) and the expanded virtual game Ge under the strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ). Let the primitive variables and the randomization variables K i t in both games be identical. The variables such as the state, action and information variables in the expanded game Ge are distinguished from those in the virtual game Gv by means of a tilde. For instance, Xt is the state in game Gv andXt is the state in game Ge.
We will prove by induction that the system evolution in both these games is identical over the entire horizon. This is clearly true at the end of time t = 1 because the state, observations and the common and private information variables are identical in both games. Moreover, since χ i = ̺ i (χ 1 ,χ 2 ), i = 1, 2, the strategies χ i 1 andχ i 1 are identical by definition (see Definition 2) . Thus, the prescriptions and actions at t = 1 are also identical.
For induction, assume that the system evolution in both games is identical until the end of time t. Then,
Using equations (2), (4) and (3), we can similarly argue that Y i t+1 =Ỹ i t+1 , P i t+1 =P i t+1 and C t+1 =C t+1 . Since χ i = ̺ i (χ 1 ,χ 2 ), we also havẽ
Here, equality (a) follows from the construction of the mapping ̺ i (see Definition 2) and equality (b) follows from the fact that C t+1 =C t+1 . Further,
Thus, by induction, the hypothesis is true for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T . This proves that the virtual and expanded games have identical dynamics under strategy profiles (χ 1 , χ 2 ) and (χ 1 ,χ 2 ).
Since the virtual and expanded games have the same cost structure, having identical dynamics ensures that strategy profiles (χ 1 , χ 2 ) and (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) have the same expected cost in games Gv and Ge, respectively. Therefore, J (χ 1 , χ 2 ) = J (χ 1 ,χ 2 ).
C Proof of Theorem 1
For any strategy χ 1 ∈ H 1 , we have sup
because
≤ sup
where the first equality is due to Lemma 2, the second equality is because ̺ 1 (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) = χ 1 and the last inequality is due to the fact that ̺ 2 (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) ∈ H 2 for anyχ 2 ∈H 2 . Combining (66) and (69), we obtain that sup
Now, S u (Ge) := inf
≤ inf
where the inequality (72) is true since H 1 ⊆H 1 and the equality in (73) follows from (70). Therefore, S u (Ge) ≤ S u (Gv ). We can use similar arguments to show that S l (Gv ) ≤ S l (Ge).
D Proof of Lemma 3
We begin with defining the following transformations for each time t. Recall that St is the set of all possible common information beliefs at time t and B i t is the prescription space for virtual player i at time t.
We will use P j t (πt, γ 1:2 t ) as a shorthand for the probability distribution P j t (πt, γ 1:2 t ; ·, ·, ·). The distribution P j t (πt, γ 1:2 t ) can be viewed as a joint distribution over the variables Z t+1 , X t+1 , P 1:2 t+1 if the distribution on Xt, P 1:2 t is πt and prescriptions γ 1:2 t are chosen by the virtual players at time t.
The distribution P m t (πt, γ 1:2 t ) is the marginal distribution of the variable Z t+1 obtained from the joint distribution P j t (πt, γ 1:2 t ) defined above.
where Gt :
can be any arbitrary measurable mapping. One such mapping is the one that maps every element πt, γ 1:2 t , z t+1 to the uniform distribution over the finite space X t+1 × P 1 t+1 × P 2 t+1 . Let the collection of transformations Ft that can be constructed using the method described in Definition 6 be denoted by B. Note that the transformations P j t , P m t and Ft do not depend on the strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) because the term P[x t+1 , p 1:2 t+1 , z t+1 | xt, p 1:2 t , u 1:2 t ] in (76) depends only on the system dynamics (see equations (12) -(16)) and not on the strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ).
Consider a strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ). Note that the number of possible realizations of common information and prescription history under (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) is finite. Let c t+1 , γ 1:2 1:t be a realization of the common information and prescription history at time t + 1 with non-zero probability of occurrence under (χ 1 ,χ 2 ). For this realization of virtual players' information, the common information based belief on the state and private information at time t + 1 is given by
Notice that the expression (79) is well-defined, that is, the denominator is non-zero because of our assumption that the realization c t+1 , γ 1:2 1:t has non-zero probability of occurrence. Let us consider the numerator in the expression (79). For convenience, we will denote it with P (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) [x t+1 , p 1:2 t+1 , z t+1 | ct, γ 1:2 1:t ]. We have
where πt is the common information belief on Xt, P 1 t , P 2 t at time t given the realization 2 ct, γ 1:2 1:t−1 and P j t is as defined in Definition 6. The equality in (81) is due to the structure of the system dynamics in game Ge described by equations (12) - (16) . Similarly, the denominator in (79) satisfies
where P m t is as defined is Definition 6. Thus, from equation (79), we have
where Ft is as defined in Definition 6. Since the relation (84) holds for every realization c t+1 , γ 1:2 1:t that has non-zero probability of occurrence under (χ 1 ,χ 2 ), we can conclude that the common information belief Πt evolves almost surely as
under the strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ). The expected cost at time t can be expressed as follows
where the functionct is as defined in equation (22) . Therefore, the total cost can be expressed as
E Some Continuity Results
In this section, we will state and prove some technical results that will be useful for proving 
Recall that P j J (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) defined in (18) . This problem can be formulated as a Markov decision process (MDP) with common information and prescription history Ct, Γ 1:2 1:t−1 as the state. The control action at time t in this MDP is Γ 2 t , which is selected based on the information Ct, Γ 1:2 1:t−1 using strategyχ 2 ∈ H 2 . The evolution of the state Ct, Γ 1:2 1:t−1 of this MDP is as follows {C t+1 , Γ 1:2 1:t } = {Ct, Z t+1 , Γ 1:2 1:t−1 ,χ 1 t (Ct, Γ 1:2 1:t−1 ),
where
almost surely. Here, Γ 1 t =χ 1 t (Ct, Γ 1:2 1:t−1 ) and the transformation P m t is as defined in Definition 6 in Appendix D. Notice that due to Lemma 3, the common information belief Πt associated with any strategy profile (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) is equal toΠt almost surely. This results in the state evolution equation in (111). The objective of this MDP is to maximize, for a givenχ 1 , the following cost
wherect is as defined in equation (22) . Due to Lemma 3, the total expected cost defined above is equal to the cost J (χ 1 ,χ 2 ) defined in (18). The MDP described above can be solved using the following dynamic program. For every realization of virtual players' information c T +1 , γ 1:2 1:T , define In a backward inductive manner, for each time t ≤ T and each realization ct, γ 1:2 1:t−1 , define Vχ 1 Claim 1 For any strategyχ 1 ∈H 1 and for any realization of virtual players' information ct, γ 1:2 1:t−1 , we have
where V u t is as defined in (26) andπt is the SI-CIB belief associated with the instance ct, γ 1:2 1:t−1 . As a consequence, we have sup
for every strategy g 2 ∈ G 2 . Therefore, we have that sup g 2 ∈G 2 J(h 1 , g 2 ) = sup g 2 ∈G 2 J(h 1 , g 2 ) = inf g 1 ∈G 1 sup g 2 ∈G 2 J(g 1 , g 2 ).
Thus,h 1 is an equilibrium strategy for player 1 that uses only the current state and player 2's information.
Proof of Claim 2: We now proceed to prove Claim 2. Consider any arbitrary strategy g 1 for player 1. Let ι 2 t = {u 2 1:t−1 , y 2 1:t } be a realization of player 2's information I 2 t . Define the distribution Ψt(ι 2 t ) over the space t τ =1 (Xτ × U 1 τ ) as follows:
Ψt(ι 2 t ; x 1:t , u 1 1:t ) := P g 1 ,h 2 [X 1:t , U 1 1:t = (x 1:t , u 1 1:t ) | I 2 t = ι 2 t ], if ι 2 t is feasible, that is P g 1 ,h 2 [I 2 t = ι 2 t ] > 0, under the open-loop strategy h 2 = (u 2 1:t−1 ) for player 2. Otherwise, define Ψt(ι 2 t ; x 1:t , u 1 1:t ) to be the uniform distribution over the space
The equality in (124) is due to the induction hypothesis. Note that the conditional distribution P[x t+1 , ι 2 t+1 | xt, u 1 t , u 2 t , ι 2 t ] does not depend on players' strategies (see equations (1) and (2)).
At t + 1, for any realization x t+1 , u 1 t+1 , u 2 t+1 , ι 2 t+1 that has non-zero probability of occurrence under the strategy profile (g 1 , g 2 ), we have P g 1 ,g 2 [x t+1 , u 1 t+1 , u 2 t+1 , ι 2 t+1 ] (126)
where the equality in (127) follows from Lemma 15 and the equality in (128) follows from the result in (125). Therefore, by induction, the equality in (123) holds for all t. This concludes the proof of Claim 2. ⊓ ⊔ Based on the result in (166) and the fact that ̺ 2 (χ 1 , χ 2 ) = χ 2 for anyχ 1 ∈H 1 , we have (χ 1 * , χ 2 ) = ̺(χ 1 * , χ 2 ).
Hence, using Lemma 2 we have J (χ 1 * , χ 2 ) = J (χ 1 * , χ 2 ) > S(Hv ) = S(He).
This is a contradiction becauseχ 1 * is a minimax strategy of He due to Lemma 8. Therefore, χ 1 * must be a minimax strategy of game Hv . Combining the definitions of the strategyχ 1 * in Definition 5 and the mapping ̺ 1 in Definition 2, we can easily show using a forward inductive argument that at each time t ≤ T and for each ct,
Here, Ξ 1 t is as defined in the min-max dynamic program in Section 5.2.2 and πt is computed in a forward inductive manner using the following relation
Further, using the approach in Theorem 1 of [27] , we can show that if χ 1 * is a minimax strategy in the virtual game Hv for player 1, then g 1 * defined in Theorem 3 is a minimax strategy in the original game H for player 1.
